The highest good (summum bonum) combines moral virtue with the happiness that virtue deserves. Kant insists that virtue is the supreme condition of the good but not its sole component: a world in which virtuous agents are wholly miserable would not be fully good. The right proportion of happiness to virtue is what reason demands of the moral world as a whole.
Kant identifies an apparent contradiction: it seems impossible that virtue should produce happiness, since the two are governed by entirely different laws — moral laws and natural laws. He resolves the antinomy not by claiming a direct causal link but by postulating God as the author of a moral world order in which the proportion between virtue and happiness is guaranteed.
The highest good is not a reward to be pursued alongside duty — it is the object that morality points toward when considered as a whole system. To work for the highest good is to work for a world in which moral agents can flourish in conditions proportionate to their desert. This gives morality a constructive, world-oriented dimension that complements its purely formal, duty-centred core.
The highest good is the subject of the 'Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason,' Critique of Practical Reason, Part I, Book II.
