Decent Peoples and the Society of Peoples

Rawls distinguishes liberal peoples — who satisfy his two principles of justice internally — from "decent" non-liberal peoples, who meet a lower threshold: they are not aggressive, they respect basic human rights, and their legal systems allow citizens to play a meaningful role in political life through consultation. Decent peoples may not be fully just by liberal standards, but they are entitled to toleration and membership in the Society of Peoples.

From the international original position, Rawls derives eight principles: the equality of peoples, the right of self-defence, non-intervention in the internal affairs of decent peoples, the duty to honour treaties, respect for human rights, certain just war constraints, and a duty to assist burdened societies. These principles constitute a minimum international morality that all reasonable peoples — liberal and decent alike — can endorse.

Rawls explicitly rejects the cosmopolitan argument that a global difference principle should govern relations between rich and poor nations. His target is the structure of domestic institutions that produces poverty, not global redistribution. Once a society achieves a just basic structure, the claims of the global poor are not claims of justice but claims of assistance. This limitation drew sustained criticism from cosmopolitan philosophers who argued it was arbitrary.

The Law of Peoples (1999) expands a 1993 essay of the same title. The most influential critique is Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (1979).