The Two Principles of Justice

The first principle holds that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. These liberties — freedom of conscience, political liberty, freedom of the person, the right to hold property — have lexical priority: they cannot be traded off against economic advantage. A just society does not sacrifice liberty for efficiency.

The second principle has two parts. Fair equality of opportunity requires that social positions be open to all under fair conditions, not merely formally. The difference principle — the more distinctive Rawlsian contribution — holds that social and economic inequalities are just only if they benefit the least advantaged members of society. The well-off may be better off under just institutions, but only if the worst-off are also better off than they would be under any alternative arrangement.

Rawls insists on a strict lexical ordering: the first principle takes priority over the second, and within the second, fair equality of opportunity takes priority over the difference principle. This ordering reflects his rejection of utilitarianism: no amount of economic gain can justify a reduction in basic liberties, and no efficiency gain justifies unfair opportunities.

The two principles are stated and defended in sections 11–14 of A Theory of Justice; the lexical ordering is defended in section 46.