The Nature of Rationality (1993) is Nozick's contribution to the philosophy of rationality and decision theory. Against purely formal or instrumental conceptions of rationality — rationality as consistency in preferences, or as maximisation of expected utility — Nozick argues for a richer account that includes symbolic and expressive dimensions. Rational action, he contends, is not merely a matter of efficiently pursuing given ends but also involves acting in ways that are appropriate to one's self-conception, that express and confirm what one values, and that are connected to reasons that would apply across the full range of possible situations one might be in. Nozick introduces the concept of "decision value" as distinct from expected utility: the decision value of an action includes not only its expected outcomes but also its symbolic and expressive significance — what the action says about who one is. This leads to a defence of some apparently irrational behaviour (voting, keeping promises even when violation would go undetected, reciprocating cooperation) as rational at the level of self-conception and social meaning, even if irrational at the level of individual outcome maximisation.
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